This is a book about the guarantees demanded by authoritarian governments that voluntarily cede power to democratic successors, employing Chile as a case study. It shows that such guarantees are a special case of a much more general problem of constitutional design: how to constrain future decision makers to do what the authors of a constitution would want while still delegating to them the flexibility to adapt to a changing world.
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Londregan, John Benedict. Work on this book began with a six-month sojourn in Chile in 1994, which was made possible by a Richard Allen Lester Preceptorship from Princeton University. In Chile my work was facilitated by the hospitality of the Centro de Estudio y Asistencia Legislativa (CEAL) of the Catholic University of Valparaíso. This research also benefited enormously from a year of unfettered time spent as a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution, in 1966 and 1997. I am also grateful to UCLA for an academic Senate grant that made it possible to do some follow-up field work in 1997. The initial logistics of field work in Chile benefited from the advice and intervention of Paul Sigmund, while I thank Sybil Abarca, Jesica Fuentes, and Marcela Villegas of the Catholic University of Valparaíso for helpful research assistance, and Carlos Hoffmann and Mariana George Nacimento for access to Senate committee records. I have also benefited from the openness and patience of politicians across the ideological spectrum who were willing to make time in their demanding schedules for interviews.
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This work has benefited enormously from the persistent encouragement and advice of James Alt, who read multiple drafts in their entirety. I have also benefited from critical readings of the entire manuscript by Avinash Dixit, Barbara Geddes, Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Susan Stokes, and two anonymous referees, and from partial readings by Jim DeNardo, Susanne Lohmann, George Tsebelis, and John Zaller. Parts of the book were presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association in 1994 and 1997, and the annual Political Methodology meetings in 1996, where I received useful comments. Parts of the work have also benefited from comments by seminar audiences at Cal Tech, 
